Aquinas seems to hold following theses on moral autonomy. «Nobody imposes his acts the law»: there is no perfect, no radical autonomy. Natural law is defined as participation in the eternal law. That means «theonomy» which for Kluxen is not primordial, but adventitious metaphysical interpretation. We could speak of «cognitive autonomy»: human reason is competent to formulate norms and moral judgements. But the cognitive acts are accompanied by voluntary consent: which is natural and necessary in first principles; becomes worlds consens (...) in the natural law conclusions ; and becomes correct desire in prudence and, especially, in «gnome» judgments. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa's A Virtue Epistemology, Vol. I is arguably the single-most important monograph to be published in analytic epistemology in the last ten years. Sosa, the first in the field to employ the notion of intellectual virtue – in his ground-breaking ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’– is the leading proponent of reliabilist versions of virtue epistemology. In A Virtue Epistemology, he deftly defends an externalist account of animal knowledge as apt belief, argues for a distinction between animal and reflective (...) knowledge, contends that rational intuition is an intellectual virtue ; and offers responses to dream scepticism, the problem of the criterion and the value problem. Nearly all of these arguments are new, albeit consistent with Sosa's earlier work; that is, consistent with two notable exceptions. First, c ontra Sosa's ‘Replies’ in Ernest Sosa and His Critics, A Virtue Epistemology explicitly contends that safety is not required for animal knowledge. Second, unlike Sosa's Knowledge in Perspective, which arguably construes the intellectual virtues as merely instrumentally valuable, A Virtue Epistemology explicitly contends that the intellectual virtues are instrumentally and constitutively valuable. Best read in conjunction with the above monographs and Epistemic Justification, A Virtue Epistemology is mandatory reading for epistemologists and graduate students in the field. It will rightly set the standard for debates in analytic epistemology for years to come.I will summarize and raise objections to two key conclusions that are unique to A Virtue Epistemology: the ‘kaleidoscope-perceiver’ has animal knowledge but lacks reflective knowledge; unlike the k-perceiver, the ordinary perceiver has reflective knowledge. My objections …. (shrink)

Despite broad agreement that forgiveness involves overcoming resentment, the small philosophical literature on this topic has made little progress in determining which of the many ways of overcoming resentment is forgiveness. In a recent paper, however, Pamela Hieronymi proposed a way forward by requiring that accounts of forgiveness be “articulate” and “uncompromising.” I argue for these requirements, but also claim that Hieronymi’s proposed articulate and uncompromising account must be rejected because it cannot accommodate the fact that only some agents have (...) the standing to forgive. I end by sketching an alternative account which, I claim, explains the phenomenon of standing. (shrink)

Much of the fear and uncertainty around Zika epidemics stem from potential association between Zika virus complications on infected pregnant women and risk of their babies being born with microcephaly and other neurological abnormalities. However, much remains unknown about its mode of transmission, diagnosis and long-term pathogenesis. Worries of these unknowns necessitate the need for effective and efficient psychosocial programs and medical-legal strategies to alleviate and mitigate ZIKV related burdens. In this light, local and global efforts in maintaining fundamental health (...) principles of moral, medical and legal decision-making policies, and interventions to preserve and promote individual and collectiveHuman Rights, autonomy, protection of the most vulnerable, equity, dignity, integrity and beneficence that should not be confused and relegated by compassionate humanitarian assistance and support. This paper explores the potential medical and ethical-legal implications of ZIKV epidemics emergency response packages and strategies alongside optimizing reproductive and mental health policies, programs and best practice measures. Further long-term cross-borders operational research is required in elucidating Zika-related population-based epidemiology, ethical-medical and societal implications in guiding evidence-based local and global ZIKV maternal-child health complications related approaches and interventions. Core programs and interventions including future Zika safe and effective vaccines for global Zika immunization program in most vulnerable and affected countries and worldwide should be prioritized. (shrink)

Ernest Sosa presents a new approach to the problems of knowledge and scepticism. He argues for two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective, each viewed as a distinctive human accomplishment. Sosa's virtue epistemology illuminates different varieties of scepticism, the nature and status of intuitions, and epistemic normativity.

The standard philosophical view is that compulsive behaviors are caused by “irresistible” desires. Gary Watson famously argued that this view conflates compulsion with weakness of the will, and proposed differentiating weakness and compulsion by appealing to the normal strength-of-will of members of the community. This extrinsic distinction leaves no room for phenomenological differences between weakness and compulsion. Evidence from clinical psychology shows, however, that compulsion is associated with certain phenomenological features that are absent in cases of weakness. I therefore reject (...) the irresistible desire account. Instead, I propose that psychological compulsions “wear down” an individual’s normal faculty of self-control, i.e., the will. The recurrent inhibition of the behavior by the will overexerts this faculty, causing the psychological stress noted by psychologists. This stress raises the cost of resistance until it is unbearable. The subject abandons resistance and therefore performs the behavior. (shrink)

Magical ersatzism is the view that possible worlds are primitive abstract entities. In On the Plurality of Worlds, David Lewis presented what appeared to many to be a devastating argument against magical ersatzism. In this paper, I show that Lewis’ central argument does not succeed. Magical ersatzism remains a viable theory of possible worlds.

Two assertions of Halford et al. are critiqued: their claim of priority in relational complexity analysis and the sufficiency for cognitive development of their relational-complexity analysis of tasks. Critical discussion of concrete task analyses (i.e., the relational complexity of proportionality problems, of balance scale problems, and the Tower of Hanoi) serves, by way of counterexamples, to highlight problems in their method.